Under Pressure

This page exists because for some people who use these apps, threats are real. Not imagined. Not hypothetical. Real.

If that is not your situation, read it anyway. Then you will understand why these design choices were made.

The core reality

No technical system protects you from someone who has physical control over you or your device and is willing to apply pressure to get what they want. Encryption does not help if you are compelled to unlock your phone. A strong password does not help if you type it under duress.

These apps do not solve that problem. They reduce what can be found remotely, through networks, through platforms. Physical coercion is a different problem with different answers.

Think about what you store before you store it

The most effective protection against forced disclosure is not having the data in the first place.

Before you enter something into your family tree, ask: if this was shown to someone hostile, who would be hurt?

For some families, a complete tree with names, locations, and birth dates of living people is a risk. For others, it is not. Only you know your situation.

Consider:

• Using initials or family roles instead of full names for members in sensitive situations.
• Not adding location or village information if that could identify or locate someone.
• Keeping certain branches of the family in a separate tree maintained by someone else.

These are not features. They are decisions. The app gives you the tools. The decisions are yours.

The decoy option

If you are in a situation where you might be pressured to show your family tree, you have the option of maintaining two trees: a real one and a minimal one.

The minimal tree contains no sensitive members — only people whose presence in a family app would seem normal to someone suspicious. You can switch to showing this tree if pressured.

This requires discipline. The decoy tree must look real enough to satisfy casual inspection. A completely empty app is suspicious. A tree with two people in it is suspicious. A plausible-looking tree with a few generations — that is believable.

This is not a built-in feature of the app. It is a practice. You build it yourself.

If you are compelled to generate an invitation

If someone demands you invite them to your family cell, you can do so. You are the maintainer. You can also remove them after the threat has passed. An invitation that was accepted cannot be un-accepted, but you can remove the person from the cell, which cuts off their access.

The person who was compelled into the invitation should tell other family members what happened, so they know the cell has been compromised and can take appropriate action.

Your safety is the priority

If you are in immediate physical danger, comply. Do not escalate. No app data is worth physical harm.

If you need to think through how to use these apps in a higher-risk situation, the community forum is a place to ask. The people who built these tools have thought about these problems seriously and can discuss specific scenarios.

What we will not do is give you false confidence. These tools reduce some risks. They do not eliminate all of them. Use them knowing what they do and do not protect.